Le pilote
La scène commence vers moins le quart. Les personnages sont à la botte.
_ Pronto ! Don Ladene, per favore …
_ …
_ Silvio !
_ Come va Benito ?
_ Bien, bien, et toi, vieille crapule ?
_ Oui, tu as raison, parlons français, ceux-là, s'ils nous écoutent, on leur coupe les
oreilles…
_ … et la queue !
_ Haaa ! Toujours le bon mot !
_ Et la foi, Silvio, la foi…
_ Oui. Je ne t'appelle pas pour me dire la messe, on a ce qu'il faut chez nous, mais les
affaires…
_ … le Prophète l'a dit, la foi n'est rien sans les affaires…
_ … pour une fois ! Voilà : tu sais que nous avons envoyé quelques gars chez toi, ils s'ennuyaient ici.
Là-bas, on leur a dit, c'est liberté, vodka, hakhikh, mais vous ne touchez pas à la famiglia, tu es mon filleul, Benito, et tes amis sont mes amis, alors il y en a un qui a dit : et s'ils nous
tirent ? C'est pour ça que je t'appelle. Tu les laisses tranquilles, ils sont au repos, et je t'envoie les bribes…
_ … sur le…
_ … non ! on a fermé les comptes, c'est dans le lac, on ne peut plus faire confiance à personne, mais
nous avons un petit paradis caché dans un coin de l'océan, même sur les cartes, avec autant de coffres que de versets dans le Coran et le tôlier est un de mes petits-neveux…
_ … tu as pensé au terrorisme ? Oui, oh, maintenant que t'es dans l'honnête, tu peux pas savoir le nombre
de malfaisants qu'il existe, le monde en est plein, ils ne comprennent pas le business…
_ … on a pensé à tout, tu as vu le dernier 33- qui… bon, on était mal renseigné, seulement nos clients
sont rois ou présidents de clubs, on a même…
_ … pas de nom !
_ Oui. Enfin, il n'y a plus de risque, la standardiste est de Leone, une vieille famille.
_ Et les bribes, tu les mets à…
_ … 5 liasses…
_ … 15…
_ … 7 1/2 et l'ouverture du compte est
gratuite…
_ … tu as vu le cours des dattes ? 10, je peux pas moins, Silvio, ce serait mal.
_ Entendu ! Tu ne bouges pas, ils ne bougent pas…
_ … on ne bouge plus, alors ? avec les British, les Loques et les Canados, c'est pareil !
_ Il te reste les Froggies, ils ne tiennent même pas au vent.
_ On va s'ennuyer…
_ … tu leur envoies tes gars là-bas, en ce moment leur seule Défense, c'est un quartier retranché, dans
les affaires…
_ … c'est bien les affaires…
_ … et puis un hexagone, c'est mieux qu'un pentagone, et tes petits auront le choix, la mer, la montagne,
la campagne, fromage et dessert, le tout karcher !
_ Et si on jase…
_ … on a tout prévu, on dira que c'est celui qui le dit qui en est !
_ Tu peux pas ajouter quelques kilos de gel, il faut bien que ceux qui restent aient de quoi s'amuser
!
_ Tu as raison, les plus à plaindre, ce sont ceux qui restent. Je le mets au courrier, le postier est un
cousin de la nièce du jardinier de mon frère…
_ … tu as un frère, toi ?
_ Nous sommes tous frères !
_ Haaa ! toujours le bon mot !
_ Benito, tu mi piace.
_ Ciao, Silvio !
Les obsèques de notre malheureux enquêteur, tombé fortuitement de la Roche Tarpéienne,
peu après avoir quitté le Palazzo Chigi, seront célébrées un de ces jours, quelque part, sans témoin.
___
The Times, October 15, 2009
French
troops were killed after Italy hushed up ‘bribes’ to Taleban
When ten French soldiers were killed last year in an ambush by Afghan insurgents in what had seemed a relatively peaceful area, the French public were horrified.
Their revulsion increased with the news that many
of the dead soldiers had been mutilated — and with the publication of photographs showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims’ flak jackets and weapons. The French had been in
charge of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, for only a month, taking
over from the Italians; it was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan.
What the grieving nation did not know was that in
the months before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008, the Italian secret service had been paying tens of thousands of dollars to Taleban commanders and local warlords to keep the area quiet,
The Times has learnt. The clandestine payments, whose existence was hidden from the incoming French forces, were disclosed by Western military officials.
US intelligence officials were flabbergasted when
they found out through intercepted telephone conversations that the Italians had also been buying off militants, notably in Herat province in the far west. In June 2008, several weeks before the
ambush, the US Ambassador in Rome made a demarche, or diplomatic protest, to the Berlusconi
Government over allegations concerning the tactic.
However, a number of high-ranking officers in Nato
have told The Times that payments were subsequently discovered to have been made in the Sarobi area as well.
Western officials say that because the French knew
nothing of the payments they made a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment.
“One cannot be too doctrinaire about these things,”
a senior Nato officer in Kabul said. “It might well make
sense to buy off local groups and use non-violence to keep violence down. But it is madness to do so and not inform your allies.”
On August 18, a month after the Italian force
departed, a lightly armed French patrol moved into the mountains north of Sarobi town, in the district of the same name, 65km (40 miles) east of Kabul. They had little reason to suspect that they were walking
into the costliest battle for the French in a quarter of a century.
Operating in an arc of territory north and east of
the Afghan capital, the French apparently believed that they were serving in a relatively benign district. The Italians they had replaced in July had suffered only one combat death in the
previous year. For months the Nato headquarters in Kabul had praised Italian
reconstruction projects under way around Sarobi. When an estimated 170 insurgents ambushed the force in the Uzbin Valley the upshot was a disaster. “They took us by surprise,” one French troop commander said after the
attack.
A Nato post-operations assessment would sharply
criticise the French force for its lack of preparation. “They went in with two platoons [approximately 60 men],” said one senior Nato officer. “They had no heavy weapons, no pre-arranged air
support, no artillery support and not enough radios.”
Had it not been for the chance presence of
some US Special Forces in the area who were able to call in air
support for them, they would have been in an even worse situation. “The French were carrying just two medium machine guns and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. They were asking for trouble and
the insurgents managed to get among them.”
A force from the 8th Marine Parachute Regiment took
an hour and a half to reach the French over the mountains. “We couldn’t see the enemy and we didn’t know how many of them there were,” said another French officer. “After 20 minutes we started
coming under fire from the rear. We were surrounded.”
The force was trapped until air strikes forced the
insurgents to retreat the next morning. By then ten French soldiers were dead and 21 injured.
The French public were appalled when it emerged
that many of the dead had been mutilated by the insurgents— a mixed force including Taleban members and fighters from Hizb e-Islami.
A few weeks later French journalists photographed
insurgents carrying French assault rifles and wearing French army flak jackets, helmets and, in one case, a dead soldier’s watch.
Two Western military officials in Kabul confirmed
that intelligence briefings after the ambush said that the French troops had believed they were moving through a benign area — one which the Italian military had been keen to show off to the
media as a successful example of a “hearts and minds” operation.
Another Nato source confirmed the allegations of
Italian money going to insurgents. “The Italian intelligence service made the payments, it wasn’t the Italian Army,” he said. “It was payments of tens of thousands of dollars regularly to
individual insurgent commanders. It was to stop Italian casualties that would cause political difficulties at home.”
When six Italian troops were killed in a bombing
in Kabul last month it resulted in a national outpouring of grief and
demands for troops to be withdrawn. The Nato source added that US intelligence became aware of the payments. “The Italians never acknowledged it, even though there was
intercepted telephone traffic on the subject,” said the source. “The demarche was the result. It was not publicised because it would have caused a diplomatic nightmare. We found out about the
Sarobi payments later.”
In Kabul a high-ranking Western intelligence source was scathing.
“It’s an utter disgrace,” he said. “Nato in Afghanistan is a fragile enough
construct without this lot working behind our backs. The Italians have a hell of a lot to answer for.”
Haji Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder from Sarobi,
recalled how a benign environment became hostile overnight. “There were no attacks against the Italians. People said the Italians and Taleban had good relations between them.
“When the country [nationality of the forces]
changed and the French came there was a big attack on them. We knew the Taleban came to the city and we knew that they didn’t carry out attacks on the Italian troops but we didn’t know
why.”
The Italian Defence Ministry referred inquiries to
the Prime Minister’s Office. A spokesman said: “The American Ambassador in Rome did not make any formal complaint. He merely asked for information, first from the previous Government
and then from the current Government. The allegations were denied and they are totally unfounded.”
Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister, defeated
Romano Prodi at elections in April 2008.
The claims are not without precedent. In October
2007 two Italian agents were kidnapped in western Afghanistan; one was
killed in a rescue by British Special Forces. It was later alleged in the Italian press that they had been kidnapped while making payments to the Taleban.
Tom Coghlan
___
The Times, October 16, 2009
Italians
bribed the Taleban all over Afghanistan, say officials
Italian soldiers with the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force at a compound run in Herat. Silvio Berlusconi said that his Government "has never authorised or allowed any
payment".
A Taleban commander and two senior Afghan officials
confirmed yesterday that Italian forces paid protection money to prevent attacks on their troops.
After furious denials in Rome of a Times report that the Italian authorities had paid the
bribes, the Afghans gave further details of the practice. Mohammed Ishmayel, a Taleban commander, said that a deal was struck last year so that Italian forces in the Salobi area, east of Kabul,
were not attacked by local insurgents.
The payment of protection money was revealed after
the death of ten French soldiers in August 2008 at the hands of large Taleban force in Sarobi. French forces had taken over the district from Italian troops, but were unaware of secret Italian
payments to local commanders to stop attacks on their forces and consequently misjudged local threat levels.
Mr Ishmayel said that under the deal it was agreed
that “neither side should attack one another. That is why we were informed at that time, that we should not attack the Nato troops.” The insurgents were not informed when the Italian forces left
the area and assumed they had broken the deal. Afghan officials also said they were aware of the practice by Italian forces in other areas of Afghanistan.
A senior Afghan government official told The Times
that US Special Forces killed a Taleban leader in
western Herat province a week ago. He was said to be one of the commanders
who received money from the Italian Government. A senior Afghan army officer also repeated the allegation, adding that agreements had been made in both Sarobi and Herat.
The report prompted the French Opposition to demand
an urgent explanation to parliament, describing the details as “very serious”. The Defence Ministry said that it was aware of “rumours” that linked bribery to the ambush but claimed that the
reports had no basis.
In Rome, Ignazio La Russa, the Defence Minister, insisted the
allegations were “absolute rubbish”. He said: “I had been minister for a short time [in the summer of 2008], I’ve never received news from the secret services of payment to the chiefs of the
Taleban.”
The minister added that a benevolent attitude
toward the Italians who serve in Afghanistan had nothing to do with alleged bribes, but was due, instead, to “the behaviour of our military, which is very different compared to that of other
contingents”.
A statement released by the office of Silvio
Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, also denied the claims. “The Berlusconi Government has never authorised nor has it allowed any form of payment toward members of the Taleban insurgency,”
it said.
Neither, the statement continued, did it know of
any such payment by the previous Government.
Mr Berlusconi was elected for a third
non-consecutive term in April 2008, replacing the centre-left Government headed by Romano Prodi.
The statement pointed out that in the first half of
last year the Italian contingent suffered “several attacks”, including in the Sarobi district where one soldier, Francesco Pezzulo, was killed in February 2008.
The US Embassy in Rome declined to confirm or to
deny the report that US officials issued a demarche, an official complaint, to the Italian Government over alleged payments to insurgents in June 2008.
A spokesman said that the embassy “does not comment
on internal diplomatic conversations that may or may not have occurred”.
The Italian Defence Ministry confirmed on Wednesday
that the US Government had raised the issue of payments to insurgents,
but said that it was not a formal protest, but rather an “informal request for information” about such payments.
Mr Prodi also denied knowledge of the alleged
payments to local insurgents.
He told The Times: “This is the first time I have
ever heard such accusations and I can say that there is no base for them. I know absolutely nothing of this.”
Fabio Evangelisti, of the opposition Italy of
Values party, said: “The details of the case, charged by The Times, appear per se to be serious and worthy of maximum attention and assessment by our Government. The ready denials of Ministers La
Russa and Rotondi are not sufficient to dissipate the doubts and insinuations about our military operations.”
Tom Coghlan
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